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TORT REFORM RENEWS DEBATE OVER

MANDATORY MEDIATION
Democrats during the midtort OFreform
term elections,
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can be expected to continue to be an
important topic at both the state and
federal levels. This is significant for
dispute resolution, because a number
of the reform measures being discussed include mandatory mediation
requirements for many, if not most,
civil cases.
I see this possibility as both salutary and troubling. It is salutary in that
it acknowledges the important place
ADR has come to have in our system
of justice. Just think about it: 25 years
ago, few legislators had even heard of
mediation, or if they had, they might
have thought it was some kind of
California fad, nothing to be taken
seriously. Now often conservative
legislators are including mediation in
measures intended to fix what they
perceive to be wrong with the civil
justice system. This is good. More importantly, mediation is bringing to disputants the capacity to have their legal
problems solved in ways that produce
potentially better outcomes and are
more satisfying for participants.
These legislative measures are
troubling, however, because they
often include mediation not as an option for disputants to consider, but as
a mandatory requirement or condition
for proceeding to trial. To me this
approach is less desirable and has the
capacity to threaten the integrity and
utility of mediation as a truly alternative dispute resolution process.
Arguments for mandatory mediation
Mandatory mediation has been
a part of the dispute resolution landscape for many years. Under it, parties
who file claims with the courts are
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particularly challenging when dealing
with clients, who rightly expect their
attorneys to represent them zealously.
Many clients confuse zealousness with
contentiousness, however, and a mandatory mediation program gives their
lawyers a reason to get their clients
into the room without giving the appearance of weakness and undermining their clients' confidence in them.
justify it.
4. Mandatory mediation brings
i. Mandatorymediation is efficient because it reducesjudicialcaseloads. It has the parties into the legal negotiation
long been argued that the civil courts process. Negotiation has long been
are overburdened, and that many of the backbone of legal dispute resoluthe cases that are filed in courts are tion, but this is negotiation that often
not worth judicial resolution either has been between the attorneys, with
because they are essentially private clients ultimately approving or disapmatters that provide little guidance to proving the results of the negotiation.
others, or because these disputes are Mandatory mediation furthers procebetter addressed in other processes dural justice values by bringing parties
that can bring more flexibility in deci- into the actual negotiation of legal dission-making than rule-bound courts. putes by permitting the clients to tell
Mandatory mediation helps courts by their stories (or hear their attorneys
diverting these cases to alternative tell them), and by providing an enviforums while still preserving the right ronment for the consideration of the
of the parties to return to the judicial parties' interests that is at least theoforum if they are dissatisfied with the retically even-handed and dignified.
All of these are significant rearesults of mediation.
2. Mandatory mediation encour- sons to support mandatory mediation.
ages lawyers to use mediation. The There are, however, a number of argucentral idea of this argument can be ments against mandatory mediation,
summed up by the punch line of a which I divide into two categories:
fast-food commercial of the 1970s: the standard arguments, and my ad"Try it, you'll like it." Indeed, there ditional concerns.
is some empirical research to suggest
that experience with mediation is the Standard arguments
i. Mandatory mediation interferes
best predictor of the willingness of
lawyers to recommend mediation to with trialaccess rights anddenies due protheir clients.1 In this sense, manda- cess. Courts have generally not been
tory mediation serves an educational, receptive to these arguments, on the
even remedial, purpose, and has been theory that these important rights are
particularly important in the insti- only delayed, not denied.'
2. Mandatory mediation contradicts
tutionalization of ADR because the
private bar has historically been much the consensual nature of the process. For
more reluctant than the bench to use many, part of the strength of the medialternative, nonjudicial processes to ation process, and a crucial element of
its enforcement power, is the desire of
resolve legal disputes.
3. Mandatory mediation provides people to be there to begin with, to reshelter for lawyers with unreasonable solve their problems according to what
clients. One of the biggest contribu- best suits their interests, needs and
tions of the ADR movement during concerns rather than according to the
the last 30 years has been to help dis- dictates of law or the likelihood that a
putants get over the idea that to settle given position will prevail. Party selfis a sign of weakness. This notion is determination is the prime directive
required (either by legislative command or court rule) to use mediation
to attempt to resolve the dispute before they will be permitted to proceed
to trial. Without question, mandatory
mediation has contributed mightily to
the institutionalization of ADR in the
United States today, and a number
of arguments have been advanced to
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in mediation, and in this view, forcing
people to be in a dispute resolution
process that they don't want to be in
is simply antithetical to the concept of
self-determination.
3. Mandatorymediationallowsforthe
exploitation of power imbalances. While
trainings routinely include instruction
on techniques to promote participation and self-determination by lowpower parties, critics may reasonably
raise questions about their effectiveness.' We can say more confidently
that unless power imbalances are skillfully handled, mediation can make
them worse, with mediators actually,
and perhaps unwittingly, reinforcing
power imbalances. The classic example is the mediation of divorce cases
involving domestic abuse or violence,
in which the higher-power spouse
sometimes can dictate the terms of the
divorce in an environment that can be
not only intimidating, but dangerous
or even life-threatening. Under this
argument, public courts should not be
putting people in this position.
4. Mandatory mediation improperly pushes cases outside the public realm.
There has been much discussion
about the "vanishing trial" in recent years, a notion based on Marc
Galanter's highly publicized recent
research indicating that trial rates
are only about 1.6 percent of all filed
claims. 4 While this finding is probably
good news for those of us in dispute
resolution, we need to remember that
this decrease in trials comes at a price.
That price includes the diminished
application of public law norms to past
conduct and the loss of precedent to
guide future behavior, as well as the
limitation of opportunities for citizens
to participate in the administration of
justice. In my view, it's important that
we route away from trial only the cases
that are more appropriately resolved
by other methods of dispute resolution, not just "cases."
Additional concerns
Several states have already taken
significant steps in requiring the mediation of certain cases as a condition for
proceeding to trial. In my view, that
experience has not always been good.
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Here are some additional concerns.
i. Mandatory mediation undermines
direct negotiation between the parties and
their representatives. With mandatory
mediation, parties have little incentive to engage in serious negotiation
prior to the mediation. This situation
is unfortunate because as salutary as
the mediation process is as a vehicle
for settling disputes, it still has to be
viewed as a second-best alternative to
the parties working things out themselves. That is real self-determination.
Mandatory mediation undermines
this kind of self-determination at two
levels. First, it preempts systemic
efforts to teach people the skills they
need to resolve disputes themselves.
For example, many schools have
enacted peer mediation programs to
teach students how to serve as mediators in disputes among their peers.
These programs are all to the good,
but where are the programs that will
provide training in the fundamentals
of conflict and the basics of negotiation, training that would enable
students to address disputes construetively themselves?
Similarly, mandatory mediation
can also encourage weak lawyering
because lawyers know that mediators
can save them from having to press
the more difficult issues themselves,
either with opposing counsel or, worse
yet, with their own clients (potentially
raising questions about the lawyer's
commitment to the client's cause).
2.
Mandatory mediation creates
collateralproblems, such as the need for
good-faith participation requirements
and all the problems they create. When
mediation is mandatory, attorneys who
don't want to be there have an incentive to use the process for strategic
advantage in litigation rather than for
true settlement. This opportunity can
lead to the cynical use of mediation as
a fishing expedition for discovery. It
can also lead attorneys to see mediation as a procedural formality, which,
like fishing expeditions, inspire both
cynicism and resentment toward the
mediation process and undermine its
legitimacy.
Good-faith
requirements
are
intended to reach this problem, but
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they also raise problems of their own,
not the least of which is how to define
good faith. It is said that in Florida, the
informal rule is that you have to be in
the room for 15 minutes to satisfy the
obligation. Is this really good faith? As
a result, we see things like the onehour divorce mediation. We have to
ask ourselves, is this really mediation?
3. Mandatory mediation can shift
practice away from being a broader,interest-based alternative, and toward a narrower, more evaluative andmore directive
style of mediation.
Narrower, more evaluative mediation may be what some parties in
fact want, and certainly has its place
in the field. But it is a far cry from the
effort by the movement's pioneers to
establish a truly alternative processone that allows parties to use disputes
to satisfy deeper interests, needs and
concerns. It was this goal that gave
the mediation movement its force and
moral authority. It would be a shame
to see mediation co-opted in this way.
4. Finally, mandatory mediation undermines the democratic characterof governmentaldisputeresolution. In my view,
when the government is involved in a
dispute resolution process, that process ought to reaffirm and foster democratic values rather than undermine
them. Mandatory mediation may be
efficient, but especially when it operates without effective quality control,
it can undermine the fundamental,
transcendent democratic value of personal autonomy and potentially other
democratic values.
Professor Frank Sander offers
one response to these concerns about
mandatory mediation, saying that one
can be compelled into mediation but
cannot be compelled to settle in mediation.' This may be true, but a failed
mediation can leave a lot of sensitive
information on the table that can be
harmful to the parties in subsequent
litigation. Let us remember that part
of the mediator's job is to encourage
hesitant parties to reveal this type of
information. Moreover, some jurisdictions have at least informal reporting
requirements that compel the mediator to tell the judge when parties are
dragging their heels.

Such consequences do not inspire
public confidence and trust in the mediation process, or in the courts and
the rule of law more generally.
In my view, the benefits of
mandatory mediation are not worth
these costs, especially since voluntary
programs can be constructed with
sufficient incentives to ensure their
use and to achieve the efficiency,
educational and other benefits I have
discussed. Mandatory mediation may
have been appropriate, even necessary, as a remedial measure to get the
ADR ball rolling when ADR was first
introduced in the 1970s and 1980s.
But the process is more mature now
and capable of standing on its own
two feet, without the crutch of court
compulsion. In my view, the mediation community should resist the
mandatory mediation tide and push
the legislative embrace of mediation
toward an incentive-based voluntary
model rather than continuing with an
involuntary model.
This of course raises the question
of what to do if the mandatory tide
can't be turned. Being pragmatic, I
think we should continue to take advantage of the momentum by being
more purposive about it and thinking
through the design questions sooner
rather than later. During the drafting
process we should let legislators know
the cons as well as the pros of mandatory mediation, and encourage them to
consider the following questions:
i. What is the real goal of mandatory mediation?If it's merely efficiency,
then a one-hour divorce mediation
makes sense. But is that what the
dispute resolution community would
want? Clarification of this question
would provide crucial guidance for
program designers charged with implementing the programs enacted by
the legislatures.
2. How will mandatory mediation
programsbefunded, andwillthe mediators
be paid? All too often these programs
rely on volunteer mediators, who work
for free for the experience, prestige or
proximity to the court. This staffing
model hardly inspires confidence in
the system, and can distort the process. The use of mandatory mediation

should not be just another justification
for cutting judicial budgets. Program
design, implementation and evaluation all have to be paid for, and the
legislature should be prepared to do
so if it going to compel people into
mediation.
3. Should there be categorical exceptions for some cases, and if so, which
cases?
4. Shouldparties be able to opt out?
Most mandatory mediation programs
have at least some basis under which
parties may be relieved of the obligation to mediate, although standards
vary widely. The concerns I have
raised should counsel in favor of a
more permissive standard.
5. What standards, ifany, should
there be for such participation? Nearly
half of the states now have good faith
requirements, although there is con6
siderable variety in their structure.
6. What minimum qualifications
should there be for court-sponsoredmediators, and what kind of trainingshouldthey
receive?
7. Should parties be given some autonomy over critical issues, such as who
the mediator will be, the style the mediator will use, and whether caucuses will be
permitted?
8. At what level should mediators
and programs be accountable? For mediators, one possibility is to establish
a government structure, like Florida's,
to consider ethical complaints against
mediators. But Florida's system is
costly and is viewed by some as ultimately toothless.7 Is licensing more
appropriate? For programs, given the
important rights at stake in mediation
and the dynamics of judicial self-interest in the efficiency of such programs,
traditional principles of checks and
balances counsel in favor of legislative
or executive oversight of court-ordered mediation programs, in addition
to internal oversight by the court.
9. What remedies should be available
for misrepresentation, coercion and other
defects in the mediationprocess?Professor
Nancy Welsh has suggested a "cooling
off"' period.' Are there other possibilities?
Io.How will mandatory mediation
programs be evaluated to assure they are
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meeting their objectives, and are not creating incidentalproblems? Even the best
of programs can fail to meet critical objectives and may produce unintended
consequences. Regular and public
program monitoring and evaluation
are essential to assure the effectiveness and legitimacy of mandatory
mediation programs.
The forthcoming legislative consideration of mandatory mediation (as
a part of the larger issue of tort reform)
is important, and presents an opportunity for those who care about dispute
resolution to educate legislators about
it. We should take advantage of that
opportunity, lest the opportunity take
advantage of us.
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